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1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

1

Tobias Barrington Wolff is the Jefferson Barnes Fordham Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School. He writes and teaches on the First Amendment and served as lead appellate counsel in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). His work on the First Amendment has focused on compelled speech doctrine and its
proper application in commercial and non-commercial settings.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reject Petitioner’s attempt to cloak
its discriminatory business conduct in the mantle of free
speech. The Speech Clause of the First Amendment has
never been a license for businesses to discriminate in the
commercial marketplace. To the contrary, an unbroken
line of cases has rejected all such attempts. When a business sells goods and services in the market, it is not a
street corner speaker engaging in a personal act of expression. Customers do not pay for the privilege of promoting a commercial vendor’s own message. Customers
pay for goods and services chosen by them and tailored to
their needs. Selling goods and services in the marketplace
is commercial conduct that the State may regulate, and
anti-discrimination statutes like the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) do not provoke any First
1

Petitioner and Respondent have lodged blanket amicus consent letters with the Court. Respondents Aubrey Elenis et al. have consented
to the filing of this brief. No counsel for any party authored this brief
in whole or in part, and no entity other than amicus and his counsel
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this
brief.
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Amendment scrutiny in that setting. This proposition
holds equally true when a business sells a product or service that involves creative or artistic skill.
Three well-established principles require the rejection
of Petitioner’s Speech Clause arguments.
First: Anti-discrimination laws regulate conduct in the
marketplace, not speech. Discrimination by a business
against its customers or employees is commercial conduct,
regardless of the service the business offers or the belief
system that motivates its conduct, and discrimination in
the marketplace “has never been accorded affirmative
constitutional protections.” Hishon v. King & Spaulding,
467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).
Second: When a business sells goods and services to
the public, it is not a “speaker” engaged in its own private
expression, it is a vendor engaged in a business transaction. Customers do not pay for the privilege of facilitating
the vendor’s message, they pay for a product tailored to
their own needs. Many businesses provide goods and services that involve artistic skill or expressive talent: law
firms, private schools, architectural firms, website designers, commercial photographers—the list is long. In each
case, when the business offers its goods and services for
sale to paying customers, it is not engaged in its own act
of personal expression, it is providing a commercial service.
Third: The compelled speech doctrine has no application in this setting. This Court’s compelled speech cases
define and protect against two specific kinds of harm:
They reject compelled orthodoxy, prohibiting government
from choosing a preferred message and requiring others
to promote or facilitate that message; and they protect
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against intrusion into the messages of private speakers,
prohibiting government from dictating to a speaker what
content his own message must include. See Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 63–65 (2006) (FAIR). These protections are vital. They
are not boundless. Compelled speech doctrine protects
against specific, defined harms. Those harms are absent
in this case.
Attempts to use the Speech Clause to subvert anti-discrimination laws in the commercial marketplace are nothing new. Major steps forward for previously ostracized
groups have often been met with attempts by businesses
to use the First Amendment as a shield for acts of discrimination. Now that lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
people have begun to escape their long history of secondclass citizenship and secure a greater measure of equal
treatment in the marketplace, another chapter in that
story is unfolding. This Court has consistently rejected
past attempts to use the Speech Clause to license discrimination in commercial transactions. It should do so again
here.
ARGUMENT
I.

CADA Does Not Regulate Speech.

The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act does not regulate speech. Nothing in the statute makes reference to
speech or expression. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601.
Neither was CADA enacted to punish businesses for their
opinions, nor to regulate conduct as a pretext for targeting
symbolic speech. On its face and as applied to the services
Petitioner wants to offer, CADA regulates business conduct: discrimination against customers in the commercial
market.
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Petitioner argues that it deserves a special exemption
from CADA because it sells a product that involves creative skill. See, e.g., Pet. Br, at 2–3. That is not the law. The
First Amendment does not exempt companies from general business regulations simply because they sell creative
goods or services. When government enacts evenhanded
laws that regulate the conduct of all businesses, no First
Amendment scrutiny is required. Only when government
targets the expressive component of a business’s activities
is the Speech Clause implicated. CADA does no such
thing. 2
In Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984),
this Court applied these principles to the commercial practice of law. Legal practice occupies an important place under the First Amendment: lawyers produce creative written work when they advocate for a client, and the legal
profession gives meaning to the right of access to court.
Nonetheless, commercial legal practice is fully subject to
laws that prohibit discrimination in the workplace. Hishon
held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids
a law firm from refusing to promote a female associate because of her sex. Id. at 71–73, 77–79. In seeking to avoid
that result, the firm argued that it was exempt from Title
VII because its work enjoys First Amendment protection.
Id. at 78. The Court rejected the argument. Title VII neither regulates speech nor targets the expressive content
of a company’s work. Rather, the Court explained, it targets the conduct of workplace discrimination, and
2

The Tenth Circuit’s treatment of CADA as imposing a content-based
regulation on speech when applied to 303 Creative is self-evidently
wrong and would turn a slew of ordinary commercial discrimination
cases into constitutional disputes. This Court should reject it out of
hand.
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“invidious private discrimination * * * has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.” Id.
In contrast, when government restricts the viewpoint
that lawyers can express when arguing on behalf of their
clients, it provokes First Amendment scrutiny. The Court
affirmed this principle in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), holding that the Speech
Clause prohibits Congress from imposing a restriction
that “prevents [a Legal Services] attorney from arguing
to a court that a state statute conflicts with a federal statute or that either a state or federal statute * * * [violates]
the United States Constitution.” Id. at 536–537. Because
Congress sought “to exclude from litigation those arguments and theories [it found] unacceptable,” id. at 546, its
law targeted expression and provoked First Amendment
scrutiny, id. at 555. In contrast, CADA—like Title VII—
does not target the expressive content of any business.
This Court has applied the same principle to private
schools. Direct regulation of a private school’s expressive
mission—for example, dictating the viewpoint teachers
must convey to students—would present serious First
Amendment problems. But discriminatory commercial
practices receive no such protection. In Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), a private school refused to
admit African-American students, prompting the children
to sue for admission under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1982. 427 U.S. at 169. The school said
that teaching non-white children would violate its segregationist beliefs and argued that the First Amendment
gave it a right to discriminate. Id. at 175–177. The Court
rejected the argument. “[I]t may be assumed that parents
have a First Amendment right to send their children to
educational institutions that promote the belief that racial
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segregation is desirable,” the Court explained. Id. at 176.
“But it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial
minorities from such institutions is also protected by the
same principle.” Id.
The Court reiterated this principle yet again in Arcara
v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697 (1986), a case involving the
application of New York’s public nuisance law to force the
closure of an adult bookstore after State authorities found
that the bookstore was facilitating prostitution on its
premises. 478 U.S. at 698–699. Although applying these
laws to the bookstore impeded the store’s ability to sell
constitutionally protected materials, the First Amendment was not implicated. When a law targets conduct and
not speech, the Court explained, “we have not traditionally subjected every criminal and civil sanction imposed
through legal process to ‘least restrictive means’ scrutiny
simply because each particular remedy will have some effect on the First Amendment activities of those subject to
sanction.” Id. at 706. It is only where the “conduct * * *
that drew the legal remedy” has “a significant expressive
element” that the Court has subjected such restrictions to
scrutiny. Id. at 706–707. In the present case, the “conduct
* * * that [would draw] the legal remedy” is 303 Creative’s
discrimination against same-sex couples, refusing to sell
them wedding-related websites if and when it begins offering that service. “[I]nvidious private discrimination” of
this kind lacks a “significant expressive element” and “has
never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.” Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78; Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706.
One can imagine a law firm or private school making
the same arguments Petitioner presses before this Court.
A law firm’s work is “expressive in nature,” the argument
would go. See Pet. Br. at 4. “Anyone viewing” a firm’s
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briefs and advocacy “will know that they are [the firm’s]
original []work because they will” see the firm sign its
name to papers submitted to the court, conveying the client’s message. See id. at 6. Likewise some private schools
select their customers, the students, to “pursue [a] dream”
and “communicate ideas” about how society should function, see id. at 5, seeking to live their values by orchestrating a pedagogical environment that will exemplify “the
message [the school] convey[s]” in its teaching. See id. at
2. All these assertions would be true. None would call into
question the obligation of a law firm or a private school to
obey neutral, generally applicable laws that prohibit commercial entities from discriminating in the workplace or
the marketplace. The same holds true for Petitioner.
II. CADA Does Not Violate the Compelled
Speech Doctrine.
Petitioner’s effort to reframe its claim as a compelled
speech argument does not change the result. This Court
has identified two circumstances that can give rise to a
compelled speech problem: (1) when the state imposes its
chosen message on unwilling adherents, or (2) when state
compulsion forces a speaker to incorporate unwanted elements into its own private act of expression. Neither circumstance is present here. CADA does not impose any
state-chosen viewpoint, and Petitioner is not propounding
its own message when it sells website services to customers with whom it transacts business in the marketplace.
A.

CADA Neither Compels Affirmation of
Belief nor Imposes a State-Chosen
Message.

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943), was the foundational compelled speech case,
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establishing the principle that the State may not impose
its chosen ideology on unwilling adherents. Barnette involved a West Virginia law that required school children to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance to the American flag, a patriotic message chosen by the State and involving “affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.” Id. at 633. In striking down the law, the Court declared that government
may not “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein.” Id. at 642.
This Court has repeatedly applied this principle when
government has imposed its chosen message on unwilling
speakers. In Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974), the Court struck down a Florida law that
compelled newspapers to publish responses from political
candidates when the papers ran editorials critical of those
candidates. In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977),
the Court prohibited New Hampshire from penalizing a
couple who covered the state motto on their car license
plate, holding that the State cannot “require[] an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological
message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and
read by the public,” id. at 713, nor force drivers to “use
their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the
State’s ideological message,” id. at 715. And in Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California,
475 U.S. 1 (1986) (PG&E), the Court invalidated a California policy that compelled a utility company to send customers environmental literature that the State chose
based on viewpoint.
The core violation in each of these cases was the same:
The State selected a message and compelled people to
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affirm that message or become unwilling public ambassadors for it. Such compulsion is impermissible if the chosen
message embodies the State’s own ideology, as in Barnette
and Wooley, or if the State selects a private speaker’s
viewpoint and requires others to promote it, as in Tornillo
and PG&E.
CADA involves no such compulsion. The statute does
not impose the State’s own message on unwilling speakers. Neither does it select a private message based on
viewpoint and require businesses to publish it. CADA has
nothing to do with messages. It prohibits a form of business conduct—discrimination against customers—and applies that prohibition to all businesses that operate as public accommodations without reference to expression. The
Barnette/Wooley line of cases is inapplicable.
Petitioner insists that CADA “exact[s] a penalty on the
basis of the content” of speech. Pet. Br. 32 (quoting
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256). That is incorrect. Tornillo and
PG&E involved attempts by the State to compel a specific
message in response to specific speech by the business: in
Tornillo, editorials criticizing political candidates; in
PG&E, a newsletter encouraging electricity usage. CADA
does nothing of the kind. Petitioner is not forced to express
any view about marriage or same-sex couples, and CADA’s
anti-discrimination provision is not triggered by a business’s speech. CADA requires only that a business selling
goods and services in the open market treat customers
equally. 303 Creative remains free to voice opposition to
marriage equality in the public square without penalty.
This Court reaffirmed these limits on compelled
speech doctrine in FAIR. The dispute in FAIR arose when
law schools sought to escape a federal statute, the Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983, that required them to
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host military recruiters at on-campus commercial job
fairs, 547 U.S. at 51–53. The law schools sought to limit
their involvement in military recruiting because they disapproved of military personnel policies that discriminated
against gay applicants. Id. at 52. The Solomon Amendment required the schools to grant the military access to
campus on terms equal to those available to other recruiters. See id.at 52–55. When law schools created or disseminated speech as part of the service they offered other participants in the job fair, they had to do the same for military recruiters: “in assisting military recruiters, [the] law
schools provide[d] some services, such as sending e-mails
and distributing flyers, that clearly involve speech.” Id. at
60. The Court found no First Amendment problem: “[The
Solomon Amendment] neither limits what law schools may
say nor requires them to say anything. Law schools remain free under the statute to express whatever views
they may have on the military’s congressionally mandated
employment policy.” Id. The statute, the Court explained,
“regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools
must do—afford equal access to military recruiters—not
what they may or may not say.” Id. Had the Solomon
Amendment compelled law schools to include pro-military
messages chosen by the U.S. Government in their emails,
flyers and message boards then Barnette and Wooley
would have been implicated. Because the statute did no
such thing, it was “a far cry from the compelled speech in
Barnette and Wooley.” Id. at 62.
CADA is an even further cry from the compelled
speech in Barnette and Wooley. The Solomon Amendment
protects a single entity, the military, and requires equal
access in a single setting, recruiting at universities. Thus,
it was at least arguable in FAIR that federal law had used

11
a targeted regulation to conscript schools to serve as ambassadors for a government recruiting message using the
schools’ own speech as the vehicle—the kind of viewpoint
targeting that Wooley and PG&E appear to forbid. The
plaintiffs in FAIR made that argument a centerpiece in
their case, but this Court rejected it squarely: “The Solomon Amendment, unlike the laws at issue in those cases,
does not dictate the content of the speech at all, which is
only ‘compelled’ if, and to the extent, the school provides
such speech for other recruiters.” Id. This holding applies
with more force to CADA. The Colorado law applies to all
businesses that sell goods and services to the public and it
protects all people from the specified forms of discrimination. Unlike the Solomon Amendment, which was a special-purpose anti-discrimination law that protected just
one institution in one setting, CADA is a law of general
applicability. It is even clearer that CADA “does not dictate the content of [any] speech at all.” Id.
CADA does not compel orthodoxy. The statute neither
imposes the State’s own ideological message nor conscripts businesses to host a private viewpoint of the State’s
choosing. Barnette, Wooley, Tornillo and PG&E are inapplicable here.
B. CADA Does Not Force Speakers to
Incorporate Unwanted Elements into
Their Own Messages.
CADA also does not force speakers to incorporate unwanted elements into their own speech. When Petitioner
sells goods and services to the public, it is not a street-corner speaker engaged in the communication of a personal
message, it is a vendor engaged in a commercial transaction. The difference is fundamental. The compelled speech
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cases in which this Court has spoken about government
hijacking or conscripting the expression of private speakers apply where a speaker steps forward to proclaim her
own message to an audience. Those cases have no application when a business sells goods and services to paying
customers in the commercial marketplace and any resulting message belongs to the customer.
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), is the paradigm case
here. Hurley involved a dispute between a gay IrishAmerican group and the private organizer of a St. Patrick’s Day parade in Boston. The gay group wanted to participate as a unit marching in the parade under its own
banner, but the organizer refused. Id. at 560–562. The
group sued under a state anti-discrimination statute and
prevailed before the state courts, which interpreted the
law to extend outside the commercial market and treated
the parade organizer’s expressive event as a public accommodation, ordering the organizer to admit the unwanted
group. Id. at 561–564. This Court reversed, finding that
this application of the law to a private speaker violated the
First Amendment.
The ruling in Hurley was based entirely on the proposition that parade organizers are “street corner” speakers
and their parades “inherent[ly] expressive[]” events in
which they speak in their own voice to convey a message
to an audience, id. at 568, 579. “[W]e use the word ‘parade’
to indicate marchers who are making some sort of collective point,” the Court explained, “not just to each other
but to bystanders along the way.” Id. at 568. The organizers must be able to select which units will march in their
parade because “every participating unit affects the message conveyed by the private organizers[.]” Id. at 572–73.
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The application of a public accommodations law to this expressive event would have forced the organizers to alter a
message they were presenting as their own.
Petitioner labors to wrap its claim in Hurley’s mantle,
quoting the most evocative language from that ruling
shorn of its analytical context. It says that website design
is “inherently expressive” and thus entitled to First
Amendment protection, then cites Hurley to argue that
applying CADA to a business like 303 Creative would “unlawfully alter[] an artist’s speech.” Pet. Br. at 18–19. The
argument fundamentally misunderstands compelled
speech doctrine. Hurley used the term “inherently expressive” to describe a setting in which a speaker is engaged in communicating its own personal message to an
audience. A parade organizer qualifies. A business selling
goods and services in the marketplace to paying customers does not. It is the customer who stands in the shoes of
the parade organizer here, not the vendor.
Indeed, it would likely come as a shock to any customer
if a wedding vendor proclaimed itself to be the “speaker”
in this setting. Imagine a website designer, a baker, or a
photographer showing up at a customer’s wedding and announcing, “Here is how you must organize your ceremony,
and here is what you must say in your vows. This may be
your wedding, but you are using my website design, my
cake, my photographic services, so this wedding is my
message. I am the speaker.” That is not how the real world
works and it is not how compelled speech doctrine operates under the First Amendment.
Here, too, FAIR provides clarity. Rejecting the law
schools’ attempt to invoke Hurley, the Court held in FAIR
that “a law school’s decision to allow recruiters on campus
is not inherently expressive. Law schools facilitate
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recruiting to assist their students in obtaining jobs.” 547
U.S. at 64. Those services “lack the expressive quality of a
parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page of a newspaper[,]” id., where the speaker is orchestrating and presenting its own message to an audience. So too here. As
the New Mexico Supreme Court has explained, “[u]nlike
the defendants in Hurley,” a commercial vendor “sells its
expressive services to the public. It may be that [the vendor] expresses its clients’ messages * * * but only because
it is hired to do so.” Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock,
309 P.3d 53, 66 (N.M. 2013).
Some customers who hire 303 Creative may select the
company because they appreciate and share its religious
or ideological views, but they are not paying to facilitate
the company’s own message any more than a client would
pay a law firm to promote the firm’s own ideological
agenda. Customers hire Petitioner to provide the website
design that the customer chooses. A commercial website
designer is neither a “parade organizer” nor a “street corner speaker,” it is a vendor offering its design skills for
sale in the market. Hurley has no application here.
CADA also does not require businesses to endorse the
message of any customer when providing commercial
goods and services. See Pet. Br. at 6 (“Anyone viewing
these custom websites will know that they are Smith’s
original artwork because they will say ‘Designed by
303Creative.com.’”) As the New Mexico Supreme Court
has explained, “[i]t is well known to the public that wedding [vendors] are hired by paying customers and * * *
may not share the happy couple’s views on issues ranging
from the minor (the color scheme, the hors d’oeuvres) to
the decidedly major (the religious service, the choice of
bride or groom).” Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 69–70.
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This conclusion rests on a solid foundation. In FAIR, law
schools attempted an endorsement argument, saying that
“if they treat military and nonmilitary recruiters alike [at
commercial job fairs] in order to comply with the Solomon
Amendment, they could be viewed as sending the message
that they see nothing wrong with the military’s policies,”
547 U.S. at 64–65. The Court rejected the argument:
“Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree
with any speech by recruiters, and nothing in the Solomon
Amendment restricts what the law schools may say about
the military’s policies.” Id. at 65. In PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Court rejected a similar argument made by a shopping center that objected to
a law requiring equal access to its property for groups engaged in demonstrations. As the Court explained, views
expressed by private citizens at “a business establishment
that is open to the public” would “not likely be identified
with those of the owner,” particularly where there was no
“governmental discrimination for or against a particular
message” and the business owner was free to “disavow
any connection with the message.” Id. at 87. Equal access
laws do not compel endorsement in a commercial setting. 3

3

If 303 Creative has a particular desire not to be associated with
customers who purchase its products then it can place a disclaimer
on its website making clear that its customers’ messages are not
its own. Likewise, the company has the option not to place its imprint on the website designs it sells if it fears misattribution. Nothing in the stipulated facts suggests that the company’s imprint is
one of the services customers will pay for. See Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari at 187a, Joint Stipulation of Stipulated Facts ¶83 (describing Petitioner’s practice of including its imprint on websites
with no mention that doing so is a service owed to customers).
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CADA does not impose any state-chosen message on
Petitioner. It does not regulate any “inherently expressive” setting in which Petitioner is a “street corner
speaker” propounding its own message. And it does not
require Petitioner to endorse any message of its customers. 303 Creative may prefer not to take business from gay
couples, but that desire does not transform a prohibition
on commercial discrimination into compelled speech.
C.

Petitioner’s Comparison of Its Website
Services to Works by Great Artists is
Inapposite.

These principles answer the array of comparisons that
Petitioner advances. Applying CADA to Petitioner’s sale
of websites in the public market, it argues, would threaten
to “separate Picasso from his brush or Faulkner from his
pen,” Pet. Br. at 20, and would “force Muslim filmmakers
to promote Scientology or force lesbian artists to design
church websites criticizing same-sex marriage.” Pet. Br. at
26. The argument blurs the fundamental distinction between artists producing their own work and vendors setting up a business to sell goods and services in the commercial marketplace.
Artists are free to create according to their own inspiration, unhindered by government dictates about content.
No painter, sculptor, filmmaker or writer can be told what
subject to portray when crafting their own work. Picasso
in his studio and Faulkner in his study are safe from intrusion. But when an artist sets up a business in which he sells
his skills to any paying customer in the commercial marketplace, he is no longer engaged in the creation of his own
work. He is selling his skills for a fee. An artist who
chooses to operate that kind of business cannot
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discriminate against customers based on race, sexual orientation, or religion in violation of CADA, any more than
a law firm can violate federal anti-discrimination law when
choosing its employees or a private school when selecting
its customers. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78; Runyon, 427
U.S. at 175–176. The issue is not what kinds of artists are
protected but what kinds of business activities are subject
to commercial regulation.
Suppose that a painter sets up a store and offers to
paint the portrait of any paying customer, advertising his
business to the general public. When an Asian woman enters the store, however, the owner turns her away, saying,
“I don’t paint portraits of Asian women.” The store would
stand in violation of CADA and the First Amendment
would pose no obstacle to liability. The painter brings his
artistic talents to his work and creates a product with undoubted artistic value, but he is not engaged in his own act
of expression when he sets up a portraits-for-hire store.
The store creates the product specified by the customer, it
does not get paid to engage in its own act of expression.
That fact renders compelled speech doctrine inapposite.
Discrimination against customers in this setting is commercial conduct the State may prohibit. See FAIR, 547
U.S. at 60. The Picassos of the world are equally bound by
this principle.
In contrast, consider a painter (or a filmmaker or calligrapher, Pet. Br. at 26–27) who creates art on his own
time, choosing subjects according to his own inspiration,
and then sets up a store to sell his pieces to the public.
Barnette and Hurley would invalidate any law that dictated the content of the artist’s creations. Picasso is protected. The artist engages in his own act of expression
when he chooses subjects and creates his work, and any
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interference by the State would constitute a regulation of
his message. However, when the same artist displays his
work in a store and sells it to the general public, he may
not turn away customers based on race or religion, even if
he would prefer not to sell his paintings, films, or calligraphy to certain types of people. Picasso can follow his muse
free from regulation, but he cannot set up a no-Jews-allowed store in the public market as the vehicle for selling
his work. Selling a product in the marketplace is business
conduct and a public accommodations law can prohibit discrimination in that setting without any threat to First
Amendment values. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78.
III. Petitioner’s Position Would Replace a Clear
Rule with an Unworkable Standard That Has
No Limiting Principle.
This Court’s cases set forth a clear rule: When a business sells goods and services in the public market, it must
abide by neutral regulations on commercial conduct. The
Free Speech Clause protects businesses from contentbased regulation of their goods and services and prohibits
laws that would force businesses to promulgate a government-chosen message, but those principles pose no obstacle to neutral regulations of business conduct. This Court
has consistently adhered to that rule in the commercial
marketplace, and for good reason. As Justice O’Connor
emphasized in the expressive association setting, a clear
rule rejecting any ability of commercial entities to “gain
protection for discrimination” has been necessary to avoid
“cast[ing] doubt on the power of States to pursue the profoundly important goal of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to commercial opportunities in our society.” Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632–635 (1984) (O’Connor,
J., concurring).

19
The position Petitioner advances would destroy that
clarity. Cobbling together broad statements of principle
and rhetorically powerful sentences from a wide array of
precedents, Petitioner asks this Court to head down a path
marked by no discernable standards with no obvious stopping point. If a commercial website designer can claim a
special exemption from anti-discrimination laws because
it sells products that involve creative ability, any business
that sells goods or services involving skill with images or
words could argue for a similar exemption. Petitioner’s
own papers indicate as much. See Pet. Br. at 4 (arguing
that 303 Creative can violate anti-discrimination laws because it sells goods and services that “contain images,
words, symbols, and other modes of expression”).
The result would be a morass. The enforceability of
myriad commercial regulations would fall into doubt and
ordinary business disputes would regularly become constitutional cases. Courts would be plagued with unanswerable questions: which goods are artistic enough, and which
commercial services involve sufficiently distinctive use of
language, to create a colorable argument for a First
Amendment exemption to general business regulations?
Could an architecture firm demand searching First
Amendment scrutiny for every safety regulation or zoning
law that “compels” it to “change the content of its artistic
message” in designing a structure? Could a tailor refuse
to sell bespoke clothes to an unwanted customer based on
race or religion in order to avoid the “compulsion” of creating “custom-made art” for groups the owner views with
disfavor? Petitioner blithely lists every “publisher, writer,
printer, painter, calligrapher, website designer, tattoo artist, photographer, and videographer” among the host of
businesses that would have a special constitutional right

20
to operate as a public accommodation in the commercial
marketplace without abiding by general business regulations. Pet. Br. at 30. The doctrine would be unsustainable
and Petitioner provides no limiting principle to suggest
otherwise.
The Speech Clause gives broad protection to businesses that sell products and services containing expressive or artistic elements. It prohibits government from
dictating their creative method, as in Velazquez, prevents
the State from selecting ideological messages and using
businesses as tools for their dissemination, as in Tornillo
and PG&E, and protects the right of business owners to
engage in their own expression in the public square. But
the First Amendment does not entitle businesses to operate in the marketplace without any restriction on their
conduct. Discrimination against customers and employees
in the market is business conduct that “has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.” Hishon,
467 U.S. at 78. This Court has consistently adhered to that
clear rule. It should do so again here.
IV. This Court Should Not Decide an As-Applied
Challenge Asserted by a Business that has
Never Offered the Service it Claims is
Protected.
303 Creative has never sold wedding-related websites,
never turned away an actual same-sex couple, never performed any of the services that form the basis of its asapplied challenge to CADA. Pet. Br. at 2, 6–7; Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 189a–190a, Joint Stipulation of Stipulated Facts ¶¶95–96. The company advances its claims
before this Court in a hypothetical posture. That fact
makes it impossible for the Court to issue a ruling on any
but the most categorical version of Petitioner’s claims. If
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the Court rejects those categorical claims, as clearly established law requires, then it should leave unaddressed
the more fine-grained questions Petitioner attempts to advance. If necessary, those questions can be answered in a
future case involving actual products sold to actual customers that will allow for meaningful as-applied analysis.
Petitioner seeks a ruling that the First Amendment
shields its commercial services from CADA and other
anti-discrimination laws because its wedding websites will
be bespoke products made using Petitioner’s artistic and
creative talent. If the Court rejects the categorical argument that any “creative” business is exempt from all public accommodation laws, Petitioner and some amici invite
the Court to use the custom nature of Petitioner’s products as the basis for a holding that CADA cannot be applied to this specific business. Pet. Br. at 19–20; Brief of
Amicus Curiae Prof. Dale Carpenter et al., at 11.
How is this Court to issue such a ruling when Petitioner has never created this product for a paying customer? The Court would be crafting a ruling based on description and prediction rather than a concrete record. It
may turn out that wedding websites are more modular and
formulaic than Petitioner suggests, with most of Petitioner’s creativity going into making a well-designed template where customers simply plug in their images and details. On that set of facts, would 303 Creative lose constitutional protection that this Court previously extended on
a guess? Indeed, what if the owner of 303 Creative
changes her mind about expanding into the wedding business after this case is over, deciding that she has made her
point? This Court will have issued an advisory opinion.
Petitioner also seeks a ruling on CADA’s Publication
Clause (referred to as the Communication Clause by the
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Tenth Circuit) based on a Proposed Statement it says it
will use to announce that it will not work with gay customers when it begins selling wedding websites. Pet. Br. at 33–
35. Petitioner acknowledges that the legality of an explicit
announcement that it refuses to serve gay couples would
rise or fall on the legality of denying service to those couples in the first place, see id. at 34–35, but it argues that
the Proposed Statement differs from a “gay couples not
served here” sign because (1) it proposes only to turn gay
couples away from its wedding-related services and not
other website products, which it says would not constitute
discrimination at all, and (2) it argues that its denial of that
service to gay customers would be constitutionally protected. Pet. Br. at 33−34.
Petitioner’s repeated insistence that it does not discriminate because it only refuses to serve gay customers
in one part of its business is analytical nonsense. Pet Br. at
22, 37, 40. A hotel cannot refuse to rent the honeymoon
suite to Latino customers simply because it is willing to
put them in standard double rooms and let them use the
business center. Every discriminatory refusal to provide
services to a customer is measured independently. See,
e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273
(1976) (holding that two White employees alleging a single
act of discrimination stated a claim under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act). If Petitioner refuses to sell wedding-related websites to gay couples, that will be illegal discrimination and an announcement of that policy of discrimination will receive no constitutional protection.
But all of this misses the heart of the Publication
Clause and provisions like it in other anti-discrimination
laws. Once it is clear that a business may not refuse to
serve gay customers, of course the execution of that policy
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through a “gays not served here” sign is unprotected.
When actual customers and businesses clash over statements indicating that “the full and equal enjoyment” of a
public accommodation “will be refused” on a discriminatory basis “or that an individual’s patronage or presence .
. . is unwelcome, objectionable, unacceptable or undesirable,” CADA § 24-34-601(2)(a), they fight over messier
facts. Can a statement of values at the physical or virtual
door of a business ever cross a line and become a constructive denial of service, for example? There is no doubt that
303 Creative and its owner can voice objections in the public square about the requirement that they serve gay couples without fear of punishment, but suppose the company
tells every gay customer, “I will comply with CADA and
provide you a wedding website but I want you to know I
am doing it under protest.” What if gay customers encounter a hostile attitude or unwelcome patterns of speech
when other customers do not, or receive goods and services of inferior quality? When will facts like these rise to
a constructive denial of service and when, if ever, will the
First Amendment protect the business in this setting?
This Court cannot address such questions without a
party before it that has actually engaged in conduct or
speech that might trigger a legal response and without a
record that provides a concrete basis on which to draw
careful distinctions. If the Court rejects Petitioner’s categorical argument that any business selling goods and services with a creative dimension has a right to violate antidiscrimination laws, it should decline Petitioner’s invitation to decide more fine-grained questions not properly
presented in this case.
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CONCLUSION
There is no reason to doubt that the owner of 303 Creative has a sincere desire to refuse business from samesex couples in the wedding-related services she plans to
offer. Sincerity has never been lacking in disputes involving discrimination in the public marketplace. Business
owners during the era of Jim Crow sincerely believed
their devotion to faith and the fabric of society itself depended on racial apartheid in public spaces. Employers in
the 1940s and 50s sincerely believed that women entering
the workforce should remain in professions associated
with traditional gender roles. Homeowners throughout
the 20th century sincerely believed that allowing Catholics
or Jews to move into their neighborhoods would degrade
their communities. Many people continue to hold similar
beliefs today, even as the commercial practices associated
with them have been made illegal under anti-discrimination laws that are now widely accepted.
The law cannot conjure away conflict among sincere
beliefs, nor may it punish people whose beliefs fall out of
favor. As Justice Jackson warned eighty years ago: “Those
who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification
of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. Holding the line on those principles is a primary task of the Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.
What the law can do, and what Colorado has done, is
to establish rules of conduct that all participants in the
commercial marketplace must satisfy. Small business
owners and corporate managers alike retain the right to
express their views in the public square, criticize laws like
CADA, and voice their objection to the requirement that
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they serve unwanted customers. The First Amendment
protects that speech. But the First Amendment has never
granted dissenters the right to defy neutral regulations on
commercial conduct. The Speech Clause protects belief
and expression. It affords no sanctuary for discriminatory
conduct in the public marketplace.
The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Tobias Barrington Wolff
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
215-898-7471
twolff@law.upenn.edu

Eric Alan Stone
Counsel of Record
Timothy J. Beavers
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison
1285 Avenue of the
Americas
New York, NY 10019-6064
212-373-3376
estone@paulweiss.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae

August 19, 2022

